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U.S.  agricultural  commodities  are  predominantly  exported  rather  than  im- 
ported, but border price distortions for the exported commodities nonetheless 
exist, in the form of export subsidies. This paper investigates the economics 
and politics of export subsidies for the commodity where these subsidies are 
most important, wheat, and focuses on the Export Enhancement Program initi- 
atedin 1985. 
6.1  Background: Agricultural Price Support Programs 
Systematic programs to support agricultural commodity prices date from the 
initial New Deal legislation  of  1933. Wheat was one of the original “basic” 
commodities supported (the others were cotton, corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and 
milk).’ Wheat continues to be one of the most heavily supported commodities. 
Table 6.1 shows estimates of transfers to producers of wheat and other com- 
modities during  1984-87,  our period  of  primary concern. Wheat fares well, 
with $3.25 billion in estimated net gains (producers’ surplus) annually, 48 per- 
cent of the market value of wheat. 
The means of  support have been predominantly domestic market interven- 
tions-government  purchases, supply controls, payments to producers-but 
border measures have inevitably been required to maintain U.S. prices above 
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1. Rye, flax, barley, grain sorghum, cattle, peanuts, and sugar (beets and cane) were added in 
1934. The only important commodities excluded were poultry and eggs, soybeans, forage crops, 
fruits, and vegetables. A useful, detailed discussion of agricultural policy in the 1930s is Bene- 
dict (1953). 
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Table 6.1  Estimated Annual Gains from Commodity Programs, 1984-87 
Number of  Market Value of 
Producers  Producers’ Gains  Crop 
(thousands)  (million $)  (million $)  Protection Rate 
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corresponding  world  market  levels. Commodities  imported  into the United 
States-sugar,  citrus juices, dairy products,  wool,  meats-are  protected by 
means  of  tariffs  or quantitative restrictions  on  imports. But  a substantially 
greater volume of U.S. agricultural output is exported (fig. 6. l),  causing greater 
difficulty for domestic price support. 
Attempts have been made to explain the economic and political forces that 
result  in agricultural price supports generally, and the political  economy  of 
differences between the support provided for different commodities. Explana- 
tions have focused on political factors such as the long tenure of mostly rural 
Southern committee chairmen in Congress, the fact that rural areas are more 
than proportionally represented in the Senate, and general sympathy for farm 
people  among  the  nonfarm  population  (see  Benedict  1953; Hardin  1968; 
Bonnen and Browne 1989; Rapp 1988). 
In Gardner (1987), I attempt to explain differences between commodities in 
the level of support granted. There is not clear evidence that having either a 
small or large number of  producers or being geographically concentrated or 
dispersed makes much difference in the degree of  protection. But it helps a 
commodity’s political prospects significantly to be an imported product and to 
have experienced a recent price decline, And it harms a product’s prospects to 
be highly elastic in both supply or demand (making it difficult for either pro- 
duction controls or subsidies to transfer a large amount to producers without 
generating  relatively  large  deadweight  losses).  Nonetheless,  most  of  the 
commodity-to-commodity  variation  in protection remains unexplained. Fur- 
ther progress in understanding U.S. agricultural protection may well require 
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Fig. 6.1  Agricultural exports minus imports (1982-84 dollars) 
Source: USDA, Agriculrurul Statistics (Washington, D.C., various years). 
6.1.1 
Immediately following World War I1 wheat exports became a large compo- 
nent of the demand for U.S. wheat (fig. 6.2). In 1950,35 percent of production 
was  exported, and over half the crop has been exported in  1980-93.  At the 
same time, wheat prices have  been seen by  producers as generally too low 
throughout the postwar period. These concerns have  been politically potent 
enough to maintain Depression-era wheat program mechanisms in place to the 
present. The new element in the 1950s was the importance of the export mar- 
ket, and the problems and opportunities this posed for the wheat price sup- 
port program. 
The traditional means of price support is a governmental agreement, through 
its Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), to buy wheat at the support price. 
This program periodically led  to  governmental acquisition of  large stocks 
which were costly to store and for which markets did not exist at the support 
price level. Three main policy instruments have been on the agenda for solving 
the surplus commodity problem: subsidizing sales abroad, implementing acre- 
age reduction programs, and permitting market prices to fall while compensat- 
ing producers with “deficiency” payments when the market price falls below a 
legislated target price. 
In post-World  War  I1 wheat policy, subsidized sales abroad were the first 
approach tried. Continued foreign donations of wheat were a natural follow- 
up to the Marshall Plan. They were systematized in the Agricultural Trade and 
Development Act of  1954 (known as P.L.  480 and, as reformulated in  the 
1960s, Food for Peace). At the same time U.S.  commercial wheat exports were 
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Fig. 6.2  Wheat trade 
Source: USDA, Agriculrurul Srutisrics (Washington, D.C., various years) 
subsidized in the framework of the International Wheat Agreement, under gen- 
eral  authority given the  secretary of  agriculture  in the  1930s. The subsidy 
ranged from 5 to 30 percent of the price of  wheat, depending on world and 
U.S. market conditions in each year. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of  1933 
(section 22) gave the president authority, strengthened in the Agricultural Act 
of 1948, to impose import quotas if imports threatened the effectiveness of any 
price support program.* 
In the mid- 1950s it became apparent that food aid and subsidized commer- 
cial exports were insufficient to dispose of U.S. wheat surpluses. Acreage allot- 
ments, a feature of the 1930s programs, were reintroduced in 1954 and reduced 
planted acreage by about 18 million acres (from 79 million in 1953 to an aver- 
age of  61  million  in  1954-56).  Each producer  had to stay under the farm’s 
allotment in order to be eligible for price support loans. In 1956 the Soil Bank 
program was introduced. It paid wheat growers about $20 per acre (roughly 
market rental rates) to idle an average of 12 million more acres (20 percent of 
preprogram acreage) in 1956-58. 
In 1964 the approach of letting price supports fall, with compensating pay- 
ments to producers,  was introduced. The support price was cut essentially  to 
2. Small quantities of wheat imports were grandfathered in by a lower limit of  the wheat import 
quota at 50 percent of  the quantity imported in a base period determined by  the president. The 
wheat imports shown in fig. 6.2 are from Canada. Section 22 quotas were suspended by executive 
order in 1974, but a recent increase in U.S. imports of Canadian wheat has led to calls for their 
reimposition and a one-year tariff rate quota in 1994-95. 295  The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat 
the world market-clearing level, with the idea of reducing CCC stocks and the 
need for export subsidies. At the same time, payments were made to guarantee 
higher farmer receipts for that fraction of the wheat crop sold domestically. 
Each producer received  a “domestic allotment” for purposes  of  calculating 
this payment. 
Acreage idling, payments, and export subsidies all remained in place until 
the commodity boom that erupted with the large Soviet wheat purchases of 
July 1972. During 1973-76  market prices were well above support levels. The 
conflation of Soviet purchases, the oil shock, income growth in food-importing 
countries, and accelerating U.S. inflation convinced many that a watershed had 
been crossed that meant an end to the era of agricultural surpluses. Acreage 
reduction programs were abandoned and farmers were encouraged, in the sec- 
retary of agriculture’s phrase, to plant fencerow to fencerow. The Nixon admin- 
istration went so far as to replace export subsidies by quantitative limitations 
on exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1974-76. 
By late 1976 the boom mentality had begun to fade, for wheat before any 
other major crop. In October  1976 President Ford, at the urging of Senator 
Dole and others, raised the CCC loan rate for wheat from $1.37 to $2.25 per 
bushel. President Carter was confronted within a year of taking office by  a 
tractorcade, led by wheat growers, that resulted in legislation that resurrected 
the traditional wheat policy instruments. However, sustained intervention  on 
the pre-1972 scale did not reappear until the mid-1980s.  See table 6.2 for a 
summary of indicators. 
6.2  Origins of the Export Enhancement Program 
Agriculture in general faced severe economic problems in the early 1980s. 
The problems are apparent in the data on farm income and the farm sector’s 
balance  sheet.  Real  farm  income  (including  government  assistance)  in 
1980-84  averaged about half its level in 1971, before the commodity boom 
(fig. 6.3). The USDA’s estimate of farm equity, the value of farm assets minus 
liabilities, declined from $1.14 trillion  (1987 dollars) on January  1, 1979, to 
one-half of that value, $0.6 trillion, on January 1, 1985. 
With respect to wheat growers more specifically there are no data on income 
or equity value, but an indication that is particularly  useful in political terms 
can be obtained from state-level statistics. Kansas and North Dakota are the 
two most important wheat states, the centers of  the winter and spring wheat 
growing areas, respectively. Together they account for about 30 percent of U.S. 
wheat acreage. Within these states, 46 percent of Kansas cropland and 45 per- 
cent of  North Dakota cropland is planted  to wheat. In both states, real farm 
equity declined sharply after 1979 (fig. 6.4), at about the same rate as in the 
nation as a whole. Figure 6.5 shows the real price of cropland in Kansas, North 
Dakota, and the United States, again all declining sharply. 
These indicators are sufficient (but perhaps not necessary) conditions to ex- 296  Bruce L. Gardner 
Table 6.2  Wheat Policy Instruments, 1960-90 
Government Inventory  Acreage Diversion 






































































































































Source: USDA, Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service, "Wheat: Summary of  1993 
Support Program and Related Information" (Washington, D.C., November 1993). 
aIncludes wheat base placed in  the Conservation Reserve Program under  10-year contracts (10.6 
million acres in  1992). 
plain cries of economic pain from the wheat growers. The wheat program as 
revised in the Agriculture and Food Act of  1981 involved considerable govern- 
ment efforts to  assist wheat producers. The price paid to  farmers for wheat 
placed in  government  ownership was increased to $4.00 per bushel for the 
1982 crop. It had been only $1.37  up to  1975. U.S.  wheat acreage planted 
expanded 45  percent, from 59 million  acres in  1973 to 86 million  acres in 
















Fig. 63  Farm income (1987 dollars) 
Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service, National Financial Summary (Washington, D.C., 
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Fig. 6.4  Farm equity: assets minus liabilities (1987 dollars) 
Sources: USDA, Economic Research Service, National Financial Summary (Washington, D.C., 
1992); USDA, Economic Research Service, Economic Indicators ofthe Farm Sector (Washington, 
D.C., 1993). 
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Fig. 6.5  Cropland prices (1987 dollars) 
Sources:  USDA, Economic Research Service, National Financial  Summary (Washington, D.C., 
1992); USDA, Economic Research Service, Economic Indicators of  the Farm Sector (Washington, 
D.C., 1993). 
1982, the highest level since the early 1960s. In reaction, the payment in kind 
(PIK) program was introduced and idled 30 million acres of  wheat base in 
1983, the largest supply control effort ever. In 1984, direct payments to wheat 
growers rose to exceed $1.5 billion. Yet  none of  these measures was capable 
of stemming the decline in income and equity values through 1985. 
6.2.1  Underlying Economic Situation 
The supply-demand situation is sketched in  figure 6.6. Production in  1985 
is shown as the vertical line S,,,,.  While well above mid-1970s levels, produc- 
tion in  1985 was only slightly higher than the 2.38 billion bushels of  1980.3 
The notable change in  market conditions is on the demand side, where 2.3 
billion bushels cleared the market at $3.99 a bushel in 1980, while 1.96 billion 
bushels sold for only $3.08 (nominal) in 1985. The demand curves sketched 
show the magnitude of demand reduction that occurred, and the separate de- 
mand function shown for U.S. exports indicates that reduction in demand is 
accounted for entirely by  a decline in the foreign demand for U.S. wheat. Ex- 
ports declined by 40 percent despite lower U.S. prices in  1985 than in 1980. 
3. Although a point is plotted at the market price of $3.08 and 2.42 billion bushels on S,,,,,  this 
is not a point on a supply curve in the usual sense. The market price is not the incentive price for 
production because producers also receive deficiency payments and because producers held 18.8 
million acres of wheat land idle in order to qualify for deficiency payments. The underlying market 
supply curves for 1985 is somewhere to the right of S,,,, for prices above $3. 299  The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat 
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Fig. 6.6  Wheat supply and demand 
Several econometric investigations were undertaken in the early  1980s to 
explain U.S. wheat exports (e.g., Gallagher et al. 1981; Sharples 1982; USDA 
1986). Other studies have been conducted since that time, but the ones cited 
indicate the informational basis for policy decisions in  1985. Two factors re- 
ceived most of the blame for the decline in export demand: the strong dollar 
and the agricultural policies of the European Community. Between 1980 and 
1985 the dollar rose  17 percent against the Canadian dollar and more than 
doubled against the French franc, the principal alternative sources of wheat in 
world trade. The overall trade-weighted value of the US.  dollar rose about 60 
percent. An exchange rate weighted by  wheat export market shares rose 50 
percent over this period (Dutton and Grennes 1985). This means that the appar- 
ent fall of 25 percent in the dollar price of wheat between 1980 and 1985 was 
actually a rise of about that much relative to competing sellers in terms of the 
buyers’ currencies. 
EC policies in this period were a continuation of  those in effect since the 
1960s under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Commu- 
nity. Wheat prices received by  producers in the European Community have 
averaged about double the U.S. farm price. The main means of protection is a 
variable import levy, a tariff adjusted weekly to make up the difference be- 
tween world prices and the protected (“threshold”) price level in the European 
Community. In 1985 the levy varied between 57 and 140 ECUs ($64 and $175) 
per metric ton, 40 to 110 percent of the world (Rotterdam) average price. This 
mechanism provides EC farmers with a price that is not only high but also 
stable. 
Behind this protective wall EC wheat production expanded steadily, despite 
a limited land area. Between 1969-71  and 1989-91  the wheat area of Western 
Europe (including 4.0 million hectares outside the European Community in 
1970 but now in) increased from 17.1  to 17.6 million hectares, a little over half 300  Bruce L. Gardner 
the U.S. wheat area. Yield per hectare, however, increased more sharply, from 
2.7 to 5.1 metric tons per hectare, a rate of growth of over 3 percent annually. 
Over this period U.S. wheat yields grew at a rate of about 0.5 percent annually. 
By  1989-91  US.  yields were a little less than  half of  European yields.  EC 
yields grew not so much through genetic improvements as through increasing 
and increasingly sophisticated use of  chemical fertilizers and pesticides. EC 
production methods have been tried in humid areas of  the United States and 
have doubled yields there, but are too costly to be profitable  at U.S.  wheat 
prices. 
The result  in  trade  is that  the  European  Community  moved  from self- 
sufficiency in wheat in 1970 to being a net exporter of about 25 percent of its 
production  in the mid-l980s, making it the second-largest wheat exporter in 
the world. These exports are accomplished in the face of EC internal prices 
well above world trading prices by means of export subsidies. These subsidies 
in the mid-1980s were $80-$100  per metric ton of wheat, bringing the EC 
price from $230-$250  internally to a $140-$160  world level (Rotterdam basis) 
and costing the EC budget $1  .O-$1  S  billion annually in 1980-85. 
Between 1979-81  and  1984-86,  EC annual wheat exports increased about 
5.5 million metric tons. This amounts to 200 million bushels, one-third of the 
US. wheat export decline between  1980 and 1985. 
Overall, it appears plausible (from the perspective of  1994 as well as that of 
1985) that the combination of  the high value of  the dollar and EC subsidies 
accounted for much and quite possibly all of the decline in U.S. wheat export 
demand during the early 1980s. With an elasticity of foreign demand for U.S. 
wheat of -  1.5, a 25 percent real price increase would reduce U.S. wheat ex- 
ports by  about 500 million bushels. Together with the 200 million bushel EC 
export gain being shared proportionally by export losses of the United States 
and other wheat exporters, one can explain a decline of about 600 million bush- 
els, which is the entire 1980-1985  actual loss. 
Another factor that received much attention in 1981-85  was the role of U.S. 
wheat policy, particularly the high prices paid for grain entering the Farmer- 
Owned Reserve and acreage controls, especially the reduction of 16.5 million 
acres of wheat harvested that occurred in 1983 under the PIK program. Under 
this program US. wheat production fell by  350 million  bushels in  1983, a 
reduction of  13 percent from 1982. This would be expected to cause a reduc- 
tion in U.S. wheat exports; but at the same time Farmer-Owned Reserve stocks 
were reduced by 450 million bushels-the  payment in kind was in the form of 
CCC  stocks.  So it  is  not  clear  that  the  PIK  program  reduced  exports  (or 
propped up world prices to the benefit of the European Community). But it is 
clear that the combination of  high loan rates and supply management during 
1981-85  held wheat prices (U.S. and world) above the levels to which they 
would otherwise have fallen. Since the 25 percent rise in the value of the dollar 
could have been offset by  a 25 percent fall in the U.S. wheat price, it is an 301  The Political Economy of US.  Export Subsidies for Wheat 
oversimplification to point to the value of the dollar but not US.  price supports 
as a cause of the wheat export slump. 
6.2.2  Political Situation in 1980-85 
The economic problems of administering the wheat program involved not 
only export demand but also CCC stock accumulation as demand fell and seri- 
ous financial difficulties of farmers, stemming largely from borrowing heavily 
at high interest rates to buy land at the high prices of  1979-81.  So it is not 
obvious that wheat growers would have concentrated on the export market as 
the principal source of their problems or export subsidies as a plausible rem- 
edy. Nonetheless, there was a heavy emphasis on wheat export issues by all the 
interested groups: farmers, agribusiness, economic analysts, the USDA, and 
Congress. The main political decision points are listed in table 6.3. 
In 1983 the Reagan administration, at the urging of Secretary of Agriculture 
John Block, after debate settled only at the cabinet level, accepted the idea of 
ad hoc subsidized exports of CCC-owned wheat to targeted North African mar- 
kets where EC wheat was being sold with the help of their export subsidies. 
This was intended to serve the dual purpose of  reducing excessive stock levels 
and smiting the European Community. This venture was a substantial political 
success, affording an opportunity to attack the European Community, please 
farmers, and hold off congressional pressure for more sweeping programs. The 
impetus was thus established that led eventually to the full-fledged Export En- 
hancement Program (EEP). 
In Congress, the idea of legislation to target in-kind export subsidies at the 
European Community did not prevail when first seriously considered in  1983. 
The principal reason given by opponents was the worry that such legislation 
would trigger a trade war in which the European Community would increase 
their subsidies and perhaps withdraw previously negotiated concessions such 
Table 6.3  Events in the Political History of the EEP 
I983  Reagan administration cabinet, responding to wheat grower 
requests to USDA, authorizes the use of CCC stocks to 
subsidize certain wheat exports. 
In an agreement between the Reagan administration and Senate 
Agriculture Committee bipartisan leadership, the EEP is 
formally established and publicly announced as an ongoing 
in-kind export subsidy, with $2 billion in CCC stocks to be 
used for this purpose. 
April-May  1985 
October-December  1985 
October 1990 
The EEP is incorporated in the 1985 Farm Act. 
The EEP is reauthorized by Congress and supplemented by a 
“GA’IT trigger” that reinforces and expands EEP in the event 
no GAP  agreement is reached. 
and in the European Community’s export subsidies. 
December 1993  GATT agreement is reached which requires reduction in EEP 302  Bruce L. Gardner 
as their duty-free binding on U.S. oilseed products and feed grain substitutes. 
In addition, the secretary of agriculture already possessed sufficient authorities 
for ad hoc export subsidies as needed for surplus management or strategic pur- 
poses. 
Two years later, as the 1985 farm bill deliberations began, the situation was 
different in  two respects: farm groups had refined their general support for 
export promotion to more concrete proposals, and U.S. wheat exports had de- 
clined still further while the European Community’s grew. In this situation the 
administration’s desire to continue ad hoc subsidization without binding legis- 
lation was no longer politically tenable. 
Congressional Debate 
A detailed investigation of the political positions and arguments concerning 
the EEP is helped greatly by the focus of all parties on the 1985 farm bill as 
the venue for debate. Existing legislation, governing target prices and acreage 
reduction programs, in the Agriculture and Food Act of 198  1 expired with the 
1985 crops. Because of economic problems of the farm sector and dissatisfac- 
tion with existing programs, many sought substantial changes in the existing 
legislation. 
Both  the  House  and  Senate agriculture committees conducted  extensive 
hearings in  preparation for the  1985 farm bill. The Senate committee, con- 
trolled by  Republicans  and chaired by  Jesse Helms of  North Carolina, ap- 
peared particularly interested in a fundamental review of agricultural policy 
(although tobacco policy was excluded). In  1983 Chairman Helms wrote to 
some 300 industry and academic people, asking for comments and suggestions 
for the  1985 legislation. A selection of the responses was published by  the 
committee (U.S. Congress, Senate 1984). In late 1984 and early 1985 both the 
House and Senate committees held hearings at various locations in the country 
and in Washington, D.C., at which academic experts as well as interested par- 
ties responded to requests for suggestions to revamp the commodity programs 
(US. Congress, Senate 1985~). 
Two issues of program structure emerged for the grain programs (beyond 
the  overriding  general  issue  of  the  budget  for these  programs).  The first 
was whether to support farmers’ returns by means of further acreage controls 
coupled with increased market price support via CCC loan rates, or to let sup- 
port levels follow market prices and support farm income through deficiency 
payments. The second was what steps to take to promote increased exports of 
U.S. commodities. 
Producer groups were divided on the first issue, with the National Farm 
Organization, the National Farmers Union, and the National Grange arguing 
for high loan rates and stringent production controls, and the (much larger) 
American Farm  Bureau Federation  arguing for fewer controls and market- 
oriented loan levels. The National Association  of  Wheat Growers (NAWG) 
took a middle position of marginal changes in the existing wheat program. 
The Reagan administration, in its proposed Agricultural Adjustment Act of 303  The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat 
1985, took the Farm Bureau position on phasing out acreage controls but went 
significantly further in the market-oriented direction by calling for much lower 
target prices than any of the farm groups wanted. The administration’s wheat 
provisions were outlined on March 7, 1985, as: 
Loan rates are based on 75 percent of national average prices received by 
farmers in the immediately preceding three years. 
Target prices are based in 1986 on 100  percent of national average prices 
received by  producers during the immediately preceding three years; this 
percentage would drop 5 percent each year until it reaches 75 percent for 
the I99  1 and succeeding crops. 
An acreage reduction will be required of program participants at the fol- 
lowing levels: 15 percent-1986  crop year; 10 percent-1987;  5 percent- 
1988 crop year;  1989 and thereafter, the authority for acreage reduction 
would be eliminated. (U.S. Congress, Senate 198%  part 1,403) 
The administration largely prevailed on loan rates (where they took essen- 
tially the Farm Bureau position) but lost on target prices and on phasing out 
acreage controls. The implied target price cuts led members of  the congres- 
sional committees to label the administration’s bill “dead on arrival.” 
With respect to export promotion, the administration  wanted to maintain 
discretionary authority to negotiate with trading partners to remove barriers to 
U.S. exports, and to continue export credit programs and food aid programs. 
But there were no explicit export subsidies proposed. In Congress and among 
agricultural interest groups, however, sentiments were quite different. The suc- 
cessful use of CCC stocks to pay farmers for idling additional land in the 1983 
PIK program prompted  several commodity groups to adopt the label for an 
“export PIK’ program in which CCC stocks would be used to subsidize ex- 
ports. The domestic PIK resulted  in additional  wheat on the market in  the 
United States, partly offsetting the price-increasing effect of acreage idling. 
An export PIK, it was argued, would remove commodities that were overhang- 
ing the U.S. market and hence drive up U.S. prices. In February  1983, the 
NAWG and the Nebraska Wheat Strike Force had testified before the Senate 
Agriculture Committee in favor of  this general approach. Unlike the case of 
acreage controls, the American Farm Bureau also supported the export PIK 
idea, providing a united front among farm groups: 
In  1985, the wheat growers, principally through NAWG and U.S. Wheat 
Associates, the growers’ market development arm, had been arriving at their 
position through many months of meetings. The wheat growers’ focus on inter- 
national marketing traditionally had to deal with a “prairie populist” isolation- 
ist impulse that emphasized supply management and higher prices in the do- 
mestic market. These sentiments had been fatally discredited for a majority of 
wheat growers by the prosperity brought by the export boom and sales to the 
4. Statements of  Ron Delano, president of American Farm  Bureau, Don Leslie, president of 
NAWG, and  Frank Johannsen, Nebraska Wheat Strike Force  (US. Congress, Senate 1983, 28, 
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Soviets in the 1970s. The populist impulse for an antigovernment position was 
satisfied by the wheat growers’ vociferous objection to controls on export sales 
to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in 1974-76  and 1980. 
As the 1985 farm bill debate began, NAWG backed a “marketing loan” ap- 
proach, under which producers could repay their CCC loans at the local market 
price of wheat and reclaim the wheat for sale. This essentially would establish 
a general (domestic and export) subsidy. However, the wheat growers also sup- 
ported the EEP in written testimony for the Senate Agriculture Committee in 
1984 (Schwensen 1984). The EEP approach was easy to assimilate to export 
promotion proposals NAWG already had made.5 
On the agribusiness side, the grain-exporting companies of course supported 
export subsidies, with caveats about maintaining the companies’ autonomy in 
negotiating sales. Even bakers and grain millers, who might have opposed the 
subsidized export of their raw material, did not object. The American Bakers 
Association’s president did not take a position on the subject, and the Millers 
National Association testified in favor.6  One reason is that the first major shot 
fired in the export subsidy dispute with the European Community had been an 
arrangement negotiated under existing authorities of  the secretary of  agricul- 
ture in which 30 million bushels of  CCC wheat was given free of charge to 
flour mills who then sold  1 million tons of  flour (requiring about 50 million 
bushels of wheat) to Egypt, at a price low enough to capture that market from 
the European Community. This “largest flour sale in history”  won the hearts 
of the millers. A second reason is that subsidies paid in kind out of existing 
stocks would place additional wheat on the market and would not raise the 
domestic price of wheat as a cash export subsidy would. 
Executive Branch Action 
Senator Dole took the lead in organizing a series of meetings in spring 1985 
to get the Reagan administration to establish a targeted export subsidy program 
focused on grains, especially wheat. Representatives of NAWG as well as other 
farm groups attended these meetings in Dole’s office. In May 1985, the admin- 
istration (represented by  the Office of  Management and Budget [OMB] and 
USDA)  and the Senate leadership (principally Dole and Senator Zorinsky) 
agreed to implement under existing authorities’ an EEP. 
5. Among many interesting arguments of the wheat growers, one was that the Reagan adminis- 
tration “has a double standard bordering on hypocrisy. They advocate but close off export markets 
by  placing protectionist measures against steel, textiles, and other products they need to send to 
us to gain foreign exchange” (US.  Congress, Senate  1985a, 42). This is one of  the very few 
instances in the thousands of  pages of  testimony on the 1985 farm bill in which fanners rehearsed 
elements of their traditional free trade line. Nonetheless, the wheat growers practical thrust was 
for export (and domestic) subsidies. 
6. Statement of  Roy M. Henwood, president of  Millers National Association (US. Congress, 
Senate 1983,257-59); statement of Robert Wager, president of American Bakers Association (US. 
Congress, House 1985a, part 5,  82-84). 
7. Authorities of the secretary of agriculture as chief executive officer of  the CCC under the 
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In particular,  the EEP was given the breath of life by  the  conjunction of 
interests represented by three individuals: Senator Zorinsky’s strong desire, 
as the ranking Democrat on the Agriculture Committee and representative of 
Nebraska, for a substantial export subsidy program; David Stockman’s need 
for Democratic votes on key  economic legislation; and Senator Dole’s bro- 
kering savvy, with interests in supporting both the administration (as majority 
leader) and Kansas wheat growers. Stockman agreed the administration would 
implement an export subsidy program, in exchange for Zorinsky’s vote on the 
budget resolution containing the Reagan administration’s fiscal proposals, with 
the subsidies to take the form of unwanted CCC surplus commodities with a 
zero budget score. 
The agreed-upon program committed $2 billion worth of CCC-owned com- 
modities to be made available as a bonus to U.S. exporters to expand sales of 
U.S. agricultural commodities in targeted markets. The objectives stated were 
to increase U.S.  farm exports and to encourage trading partners to begin seri- 
ous negotiations on agricultural trade problems.8 
Guidelines for the EEP, established by the Economic Policy Council of the 
White House, were that each subsidized sale should meet the following crite- 
ria: (1) additionality, that is, net increase in export sales caused by the subsi- 
dized sale; (2) targeting to displace competing exporters who are subsidizing 
their sales; (3) a net gain to the U.S. economy; and (4) budget neutrality. Each 
proposed EEP initiative was to be tested against these criteria by an interde- 
partmental committee chaired by the U.S. trade representative and USDA, but 
also having  representatives  of  the  OMB,  Council  of  Economic  Advisors 
(CEA), Treasury,  State,  Labor,  Commerce,  and National  Security  Council 
(NSC). It was never publicly  stated how the “net gain to the U.S. economy” 
and “budget neutrality” criteria were to be defined and measured. Participants 
in the process indicated that criterion 3 was not a factor in interagency debate, 
although 1, 2, and 4 were.9 
Despite the creation of the EEP through executive branch action, farm and 
commodity groups were so strongly in favor of an export subsidy program that 
Congress wished  to exercise authority and claim authorship of  the EEP by 
establishing  it  in  the  1985  farm  legislation.  The key  general  issuelo was 
whether to target export subsidies to counter competitors’ subsidies or to subsi- 
dize exports more broadly. The House Agriculture Committee took the broad 
view that subsidies in kind would boost exports by “countering the effects of 
8. Recall that the EEP was announced in the months leading up to the Ponte del Este meeting 
which launched the Uruguay Round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotia- 
tions. 
9. In November 1989, USDA published revised guidelines in the Federal Register which em- 
phasized the trade policy objectives of challenging competitors who subsidize exports and encour- 
aging negotiations in the Uruguay Round (see Ackerman and Smith 1990,6-7). 
10. “General” meaning basic principles of design. Committee deliberations devoted more time 
to specific issues of  interest to members (e.g., how much white wheat from Washington in the 
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foreign subsidies in international markets; compensating for the high value of 
the dollar; [and] alleviating the cost of transportation”  of  U.S.  agricultural 
goods” (U.S. Congress, House  1985b, 71). This led the House to support a 
broad,  untargeted  export subsidy program  called BICEP-Bonus  Incentive 
Commodity Export Program-apparently  to highlight the application of gov- 
ernmental muscle to agricultural exports. 
Legislative Action 
The Food Security Act (FSA) as finally enacted in December 1985 reflected 
the Senate’s closer ties to the administration by codifying the EEP essentially 
as the administration had established it six months earlier. The main issues, as 
often in enabling legislation, were what the executive branch “shall” (be re- 
quired to) do and “may” (has discretionary authority to) do. The 1985 act re- 
quired the secretary of agriculture to provide CCC commodities at no cost to 
“United States exporters, users, and processors and foreign purchasers” and 
required that a total of $2 billion in CCC commodities be used for this purpose 
during the three fiscal years ending September 30, 1988. The purposes which 
the subsidized exports were to serve are even more broadly stated than in the 
House bill: in addition to combating other countries’ subsidies and the high 
value of the dollar, export subsidies may be used to offset “the adverse effects 
of U.S. agricultural price support levels that are temporarily above the export 
prices offered by overseas competitors in export markets” (U.S. Code 99 Stat. 
1483). 
In addition, the act authorized the unlimited use of cross-subsidization, that 
is, the use of one CCC commodity to subsidize the export of another. This was 
politically important because many commodity interests, including processed 
products and products which did not have price support programs, prevailed 
upon the agriculture committees for support. Egg producers and pork produc- 
ers, for example, testified that they needed assistance in competing with EC 
export subsidies. But no CCC stocks of these commodities existed. The legisla- 
tion shared EEP benefits across commodities by permitting CCC wheat stocks 
to be used to subsidize egg or pork EEP exports, for example.’* 
The 1985 act thus established the authority for either narrowly targeted or 
broad-based export subsidies, and mandated $2 billion in spending on the pro- 
11. Transportation costs are a quantitatively small but highly politically charged issue in U.S. 
export promotion programs. “Cargo preference,” a requirement that food aid be shipped on U.S. 
vessels, has been an issue in EEP, export credit, and sales to the Soviets. Cargo preference has not 
been required for EEP shipments. 
12. The EEP is not as barter based as this discussion might suggest. Exporters never received 
actual tons of CCC grain as a subsidy, but rather certificates entitling them to grain at any time up 
to an expiration date six months from the date of issue. A market quickly emerged in which these 
certificates could be sold at only a small discount from the market value of the grain. Since export- 
crs could take their transactions costs into account in their bids, the subsidy in kind is very close 
to the equivalent of a cash subsidy. And when available CCC stocks ran out in 1991, the program 
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gram over three years.13 The EEP was not subject to discipline in the annual 
appropriations process because the Appropriations Committees provide gener- 
ally open-ended funding for the CCC to achieve its price support mandates. 
The committees do not control how  the CCC uses its acquired commodity 
stocks. Congress could have brought budgetary disciplines to bear by scoring 
EEP costs in Budget Committee proceedings. However, Congress agreed with 
the OMB on zero scoring for EEP. The principal argument was that CCC com- 
modities cost so much to store that it was worth about as much to give them 
away as to keep them. In addition, to the extent that increased exports increased 
the U.S. market price, deficiency payments for wheat and other target price 
commodities would be reduced. 
The EEP in a Broader Politicul Context 
The EEP came into being with very little opposition between February and 
December 1985. Why was the way so clear? The natural opponents of an ex- 
port subsidy are U.S. domestic wheat buyers and foreign wheat producers. In 
the case of EEP U.S.  millers were diverted by their participation in subsidized 
flour exports and by the release of  CCC stocks to pay the subsidies, as dis- 
cussed earlier. The bakers and broader consumer groups were relatively weak 
participants, and their participation in the  1985 farm bill debate was focused 
on opposition to acreage controls and on limiting budgetary outlays. The latter 
point was the dominant item of contention throughout 1985. 
The 1985 farm bill was debated in the culminating period of the “farm cri- 
sis” and at the same time the bill known as Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)I4 
was being developed. Just before the congressional farm bill debate began, in 
February  1985, President Reagan  vetoed a farm bailout bill that would have 
forgiven billions of dollars of farm debt and made new subsidized and guaran- 
teed loans to farmers in trouble. The administration’s proposal, in its Agricul- 
tural Adjustment Act of  1985, to go still further and cut benefits that farmers 
were already receiving caused this aspect of the bill to be labeled, correctly, as 
“dead on arrival” by congressional Democrats. 
While the testimony on export promotion was proceeding as described ear- 
lier, much more contentious and widely reported hearings were being held on 
the broad problems of  agriculture. Newsweek had a five-page story featuring 
an Iowa State agricultural economist’s estimate that 12 percent of U.S. farmers 
would go out of business in 1985 and 30 percent were “sliding toward insol- 
13. In the context of budgetary pressures, authorized spending for this period (FY 1985-88)  was 
amended to a reduced minimum of $I billion and a maximum of $I .5 billion in 1986. However, the 
actual value of  bonuses for this three-year period turned out to be  $2.2 billion. After the $1.5 
billion ceiling was reached, in  mid-1987, USDA announced that EEP bonuses would continue 
under the CCC Charter Act under which the EEP was originally established (see Ackerman and 
Smith 1990, 5,  for more detail on authorization and spending under EEP). 
14. Enacted as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of  1985, to become 
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vency” (Newsweek, February  18, 1985, 52). At  a special hearing  staged by 
congressional Democrats (no Republicans attended) three famous actresses of 
the day (Jane Fonda, Jessica Lange, and Sissy Spacek) appeared, each of whom 
had starred in movies featuring heroic struggles of farmers against economic 
adversity and insensitive bureaucrats. The actresses “decried the farm policies 
of  the Reagan administration as uncaring and insensitive to rural America’s 
anguish” (Washington  Post, May 7, 1985).15 
In this context it was probably not reasonable to expect national consumer 
groups to adopt positions in support of cuts in farm support, and none did. 
The role of outside experts on the economics of agriculture is more difficult 
to explain. Many such experts submitted testimony on many aspects of farm 
programs. In  1984, 12 economists made written contributions to the Senate 
Agriculture  Committee’s trade  policy  compendium (U.S. Congress,  Senate 
1984b). Of these, none proposed export subsidies, and the three that addressed 
the issue directly all raised objections to the idea (Johnson  1984; O’Rourke 
1984; Sharples 1984). In the 1985 hearings also, no economists supported the 
EEP. This may be in part due to a lack of opportunity, since the EEP was not 
spelled out in a form that testifying economists could react to before it was 
introduced as a nonlegislated fait accompli in May  1985. But even if econo- 
mists did not object formally to the EEP, it was clear from their general com- 
ments on trade policy that they would have opposed  it because  of  concern 
about igniting a subsidy war and because of low expected benefits to farmers 
per dollar of cost to consumers and taxpayers. 
Another source of independent testimony was the statements of five former 
secretaries  of  agriculture-Orville  Freeman  (Kennedy),  Clifford  Hardin 
(Nixon), Earl Butz (NixonFord), John Knebel (Ford), and Bob Bergland (Car- 
ter) (US.  Senate 1984b). Their comments focused on trade issues and sup- 
ported various measures to stimulate exports. But none advocated direct ex- 
port subsidies. 
During October-December  1985 the farm bill assumed its final form. The 
House passed its version on October 8, the Senate on November 22, and the 
Conference Committee reached agreement on a bill which achieved final pas- 
sage on December 18. This period was marked by sharp debate. The anti-farm- 
support side was almost entirely a matter of budgetary exposure, the endgame 
issue turning on whether target prices should be frozen for one year (adminis- 
tration) or four years (congressional Democrats) before declining. The ultimate 
compromise was a two-year freeze followed by  modest cuts. The wheat tar- 
get price was kept at $4.38 in  1986 and  1987, then cut in  steps to $4.00 by 
15. This was the only 1985 agricultural hearing to run on all three prime-time network news- 
casts. The Post quoted one actress as saying “the solid core of our agriculture is threatened,” and 
further quoted:  “‘It is  heartbreaking  to witness their anguish as they  watch  their lives being 
stripped away,’ Lange said of farmers as she choked hack tears.” The Posr played the story on page 
I, but it was page  1 of the “Style” section under the headline, “The Farm Act.” This deflated the 
impact somewhat. 309  The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat 
1990.16  Because the debate focused almost exclusively on budgetary issues, for 
wheat and other commodities (notably dairy), the EEP received little legisla- 
tive attention. 
The overall compromise achieved was of the highly pragmatic type in which 
legislators like Congressman Foley and Senator Dole worked from a middle 
ground outward to obtain a majority. Both the most ardent profarmer voices 
and most ardent budget cutters opposed the bill. The vote for final passage was 
325-96  in the House and 55-38  in the Senate. Both the chairman of the Senate 
Agriculture Committee, Jesse Helms (N.C.), and the ranking Democrat, Ed 
Zorinsky (Nebr.), voted against the bill, for opposite reasons. President Reagan 
signed the bill into law on December 23, 1985. 
In summary, the EEP was enacted in 1985 because wheat growers and ex- 
porters asked for it and no interest group opposed it, except economists in 
general terms. Because the pressure to assist agriculture was strong, and was 
countered only by budgetary pressures, the OMB finding that the EEP would 
be budget neutral ensured its supporters of an easy political victory.I7 
6.2.3  Related Export Assistance 
In addition to the EEP, wheat exports continue to be promoted by: 
Food assistance, through P.L. 480 and related programs, under which about 
3 million tons of wheat are shipped each year under generous credit terms 
that  amount on average to  a substantial subsidy on limited quantities in 
country-to-country agreements. 
Export credit, with guaranteed repayment to lenders by  the U.S. Treasury if 
the foreign borrower defaults. The interest rate is a commercial rate negoti- 
ated by  borrower and lender, typically just above the LIBOR (London In- 
terbank Offer Rate), a rate available only because of the guarantee. The U.S. 
government has had to absorb substantial losses from loans to Iraq, and the 
possibility of big losses on credits to Russia. 
The Targeted Export Assistance program, introduced in the 1985 act, pro- 
vides matching funds for private sector initiatives to promote agricultural 
exports. This program was reformulated as the Market Promotion Program in 
the 1990 Farm Act, and its budget has been reduced from over $300 million 
16. While there were no immediate budgetary savings through target price cuts, it was known 
by the  time of Conference Committee action that GRH provisions would require a reduction in 
deficiency payments for FY 1986 (the first crop year of the new bill, for which winter wheat was 
already planted). In the event, farmers had their payments reduced by 4.3 percent in FY 1986. The 
wheat target price remained at $4.00 through 1993 and continues at that level through 1995. 
17. Congress’ own budget agency, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), has not accepted 
the budget neutrality argument. Indeed CBO has in recent years called attention to the EEP as a 
potential area for budgetary savings, estimating most recently a $4.2 billion saving in FY 1995-99 
if the baseline EEP spending of $5.0 billion over this period were eliminated (U.S. Congress, 
Congressional Budget Office 1994, 218). Their clinching argument against the  budget neutrality 
of EEP is the following: Whatever price effects could be achieved by EEP could also be achieved 
at lower budget cost using ARPs. With both EEP and ARPs the subject of annual policy determina- 
tion, one should not hold the ARP constant when evaluating the EEP. 310  Bruce L. Gardner 
authorized in 1985 to about $100 million for FY 1994. About 10  percent of 
the program’s expenditures have been used to promote grains and grain prod- 
ucts with $50 million spent in 1986-89  (Ackerman and Smith 1990,39). 
Farm and agribusiness groups have consistently supported these programs. 
Groups  interested  in  international  development-mainly  nonprofit  founda- 
tions and charitable organizations-have  questioned  the negative  impact of 
food aid on food production in the recipient countries. But these groups have 
also supported food aid in times of famine or emergency. Other international 
interests have promoted  food assistance for geopolitical reasons, notably  to 
Russia, Egypt, and Pakistan. There has been no sustained political opposition 
to these programs, except as part of generic budget cutting. 
An illustration of how these programs work in tandem is afforded by recent 
wheat sales to the former Soviet Union (FSU). In FY 1992, roughly coinciding 
with President Yeltsen’s first year as leader of Russia, the United  States ex- 
ported 8.7 million metric tons of wheat to the FSU. Market receipts for the 
wheat were $1.022 billion, or $1 17 per ton. Russia and the other former repub- 
lics could not afford to pay hard currency for this wheat. The wheat was sold 
through a combination of government-guaranteed commercial credit, EEP sub- 
sidies, and food aid programs. Credit of $810 million was allocated to the FSU 
for wheat and wheat product purchases in late  1991. EEP bonuses of $350 
million were paid on 8.4 million tons of wheat in FY 1992 ($41.50 per ton on 
average). The credit program, called GSM-  102, involves short-term credit, up 
to three years, with a repayment  schedule beginning in the first year. By No- 
vember 1992 Russia’s repayments were sufficiently in arrears to trigger its sus- 
pension from the program. However, in FY 1993 a more liberal credit program 
for Russia was established under the Food for Progress authorities of USDA. 
This credit is financed directly from the U.S. government rather than through 
commercial banks and has a longer repayment period and lower than commer- 
cial interest rates. Credit is even granted, using  CCC funds, for freight and 
handling costs. In addition, 700,000 tons of feed wheat have been donated to 
the FSU. (For further details, see USDA 1993, 39-45.)  Overall, while the EEP 
subsidy on U.S. wheat exports to the FSU amounts to about 30 percent of the 
U.S.  Gulf  price,  the  package  altogether  amounts  to  a  much  larger  export 
subsidy. 
The main political pressures in these subsidies have come from representa- 
tives and senators whose wheat growers have been concerned that credit has 
not been allocated quickly enough to keep wheat moving. Fiscal cautions have 
also been raised and have restrained FY 1993 and 1994 wheat sales to the FSU. 
6.3  Consequences and Evaluation of the Program 
Questions were being raised about the effectiveness of the EEP even before 
its legislative enactment. The administration announced its first EEP initiatives 
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and 175,000 tons of wheat flour to Egypt. The administration in May had ap- 
pointed an advisory committee on the EEP, consisting primarily of commodity 
group and agribusiness representatives. In August, the committee’s representa- 
tives from the National Corn Growers and U.S. Wheat Associates, joined by 
four other committee members, issued a press release saying they were “disap- 
pointed  and frustrated over the lack of  any concrete results from the EEP’ 
(National Corn  Growers Association  1985). In  October  and  November  the 
House Committee on Agriculture’s Subcommittee on Department Operations, 
Research, and Foreign Agriculture held hearings to review complaints about 
EEP administration. 
The substance of the commodity group complaints was that the EEP was 
being carried out in too restrictive a manner. In particular, the groups argued 
that wheat sales to the Soviets fell under the EEP criteria listed earlier. The 
European Community had since 1980 expanded its subsidized wheat exports 
to the Soviet Union substantially, yet USDA had not approved an EEP initiative 
for U.S. wheat sales to the Soviet Union. The Soviets were switching wheat 
purchases from the United States to the European Community, even though 
that meant not honoring their purchase agreements with the United States un- 
der a previously  negotiated  long-term  grain  sales agreement.  The hearings 
made clear, however, that even if USDA were willing to accede to the Soviets’ 
ploy to acquire previously  agreed upon shipments at a lower price, potential 
exporters of nonagricultural products to the USSR would not accept the subsi- 
dizing of wheat sales to the USSR while other holds on U.S.-Soviet economic 
arrangements were in place as part of the political struggle for freer emigration 
from the USSR (U.S.  Congress, House 1986). It was not clear, however, which 
particular export industries Congress was hearing from on this point. 
Apart from being subject to such political constraints, the procedures for 
implementing EEP were far from clear. There were (and are) two main steps: 
administration approval of an EEP initiative and USDA’s acceptance of export- 
ers’ bids for bonuses under the initiative. Approval of  an initiative is done by 
the EEP interagency committee described earlier, after a proposal by USDA, 
based on the criteria of additionality, targeting, cost effectiveness, and budget 
neutrality.I8 For example, one of the first initiatives approved was for the sale 
of  1  million tons of  wheat to Algeria. With the initiative in place, a U.S. ex- 
porting firm can attempt to arrange a sale with an importing firm (or govern- 
ment agency) in Algeria. If the exporting firm cannot meet the price offered by 
competing exporters, in this case the European Community, it will apply to 
USDA for a “bonus” of commodity certificates equal in value to the amount 
needed to make up the difference between the cost of U.S. wheat delivered to 
Algeria and the price negotiated to make the sale. USDA assesses U.S., EC, 
18. The outside EEP advisory committee understood there to be two additional criteria:  coinci- 
dence with overall U.S. trade policy and approval by the interagency committee (US.  Congress, 
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and Algerian market conditions and either approves or disapproves the deal. If 
the transaction is approved, the firm receives the certificate requested and ships 
the wheat. 
This mechanism is quite different from the approach used for wheat export 
subsidies by the European Community, or by the United States in its pre-1972 
program, of periodically announcing a dollar value of the subsidy, say $35 per 
ton, and then letting any firms who export U.S. wheat collect that amount on 
the exported quantities. The approach raises questions of how USDA can de- 
termine, for each proposed sale, what the competitors’ price is. Wouldn’t the 
competitors’ price itself be affected by EEP? And, is there sufficient incentive 
for U.S. commercial exporters to obtain the highest possible market price? 
USDA Under Secretary Amstutz testified on the new  EEP mechanism as 
follows: 
Program implementation, in terms of mechanics such as tendering and con- 
tractual arrangements, has remained flexible. Procedures have varied from 
country to country to accommodate the individual buying systems of  the 
importing nations involved in the program. 
The bonus is to be sufficient to allow our commodities to be competitive, 
but it is not intended to undercut the world market price. In other words, the 
program is designed to ensure that sales made under it are at commercial, 
not concessional, prices. 
To ensure that we are meeting these competitive and commercial objec- 
tives, a price review process has been developed. The process calls for a 
review of the level of both the bonus and the sale price. This is to assure not 
only that the bonus paid to exporters is not too high, but also that the sale 
price, relative to subsidized foreign competition, is not too low. 
In the price review we determine the cost of delivering the U.S. commod- 
ity to the foreign buyer and the price at which the same commodity can be 
delivered to the same destination by  subsidized foreign competitors. 
The difference between the two-the  amount by  which the competition 
can under-price us-is  used in determining the acceptable bonus. 
Currently, an exporter is required to post a performance security with 
CCC before CCC will consider the exporter’s offer. Once an offer is ac- 
cepted, the exporter reserves bonus commodities from CCC inventories. 
After shipment, the exporter must furnish proof of export to request delivery 
of the bonus commodity. After the exported goods amve in the destination 
country, USDA releases the performance security posted by  the exporters. 
(U.S. Congress, House 1986, 142) 
Neither this nor other statements of USDA have answered questions about 
U.S. exporters’ incentives and pricing behavior under the EEP. But these were 
not issues of concern to Congress in 1985 (or later). The main objection of 
House Agriculture Committee members to the EEP was their desire for a pro- 
gram that would subsidize most or all wheat exports, not just a subset of tar- 
geted markets. Two main concerns were raised about the operation of the EEP: 
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receive the subsidized price, hence possibly driving them to other suppliers, 
and second, it would drive down the prices received by nonsubsidizing compet- 
itors like Argentina and Australia. At the House hearings, several commodity 
groups raised the first concern, and the General Accounting Office (GAO) the 
second. 
6.3.1  Economic Analysis of EEP 
While economists’ analyses did not play a role in the 1985 legislative pro- 
cess, analytical work was available that did not make the EEP attractive. The 
standard argument (e.g., in Dixit and Norman 1980) that, for purposes of do- 
mestic income redistribution, a domestic distortion is always preferable to a 
border distortion should apply to agricultural export subsidies undertaken for 
the purpose of  farm income support. The question addressed in agricultural 
economists’ analyses is whether there are second-best or other special charac- 
teristics of the world wheat situation that make targeted, in-kind export subsid- 
ies more attractive. 
General (untargeted) Export Subsidy 
Consider the effect of a subsidy in the 1985 U.S. wheat market. Using elas- 
ticities of  -2.1  for the short-run demand for U.S. wheat exports and -0.2  for 
U.S. domestic demand (consistent with USDA analysis at the time), the 1985 
crop situation is shown in figure 6.7. Of the 2,400 million bushels produced, 
900 million bushels were exported and  1,050 were consumed domestically, 
leaving 450 million bushels added to CCC stocks at the farm-level supported 
price of $3.1O.l9 Despite the inelastic demand for domestic use, CCC activity 
creates perfectly  elastic demand at the market  support price  (not the target 
price). 
Suppose we introduce an export subsidy, s, of  $0.40 per bushel ($15 per 
ton). This drives down the world price of wheat by $15 per ton and increases 
the demand for U.S. wheat by  about 300 million bushels. The U.S. domestic 
price remains unchanged because of the CCC loan program. If the price were 
to rise above the supported level, wheat would not go into the CCC program; 
but there is too much wheat to clear the market at any price above the support 
level. CCC loan availability creates a perfectly elastic demand at the support 
price level, so the total demand for wheat, in the absence of the export subsidy, 
is D,.  Introducing the export subsidy shifts total demand to D;.  Wheat is ex- 
ported rather than going into stocks. 
The gains and losses to the United States are as follows. Domestic consum- 
ers and producers are unaffected, since the U.S. price remains the same. Budg- 
etary outlays are s  times the quantity exported, here $0.40 X  1.2 billion bush- 
els = $480 million annually. But there is a budgetary saving from not having to 
19. The legislated support price was $3.30, but this translated to an average farm-level price of 
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Fig. 6.7  Wheat export subsidy 
pay CCC loans of $3.10 X 300 million bushels, or $930 million. This implies a 
net  budgetary  saving  of  $450  million  in  the  current  fiscal  year.  However, 
current-year flow accounting (although it is what drives budget scoring) does 
not take into account the value of  the wheat the government  owns. There is 
no agreed-upon valuation of CCC stocks, or even an agreed-upon method for 
determining their value. The principal necessary calculations are (discounted) 
expected storage costs over the period the grain will be held, and the expected 
value of the grain when sold. Assuming three years of storage costs and even- 
tual sale at roughly the loan rate (acquisition price), the present value of $930 
million spent on CCC wheat is about half its cost, or $465 million. So the net 
government costs are (480 -  465 =) $15 million. 
According to the analysis so far, farmers do not gain from the export subsidy. 
However, this also occurs only because  the diagram shows only the current 
year, in which wheat acreage and input decisions are fixed by wheat program 
provisions. Under the wheat program the supply function is changed in more 
complicated ways than is the demand side of the market. Producers receive a 
deficiency payment  that they know will make up the difference between  the 
target price ($4.38 in 1985) and the U.S. average price in the five-month peak 
marketing season (June-October).  So they should make planting decisions, in 
the preceding autumn for winter wheat and spring for spring wheat, based on 
the target price, not the expected market price. However, in order to qualify 
for deficiency payments farmers had to stay within their acreage base and hold 
idle 20 percent of base acreage. Therefore, the incentive  price for growing 
wheat is considerably less than the target price. For 1985 I have estimated that 
the average producer's incentive price was about $3.75 per bushel as compared 
to the $4.38 target price (Gardner  1991). Moreover, producers are limited in 
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already mentioned. They can expand output by using more fertilizer or other 
inputs, but deficiency payments provide no incentive for this because payments 
are made on a fixed (since 1981) yield base which is assigned to each producer. 
A final complication is that, principally because of land-idling requirements, 
some farmers choose not to participate. For them the incentive  price is the 
market price. 
In calculating farmers’ gains from an export subsidy, these considerations 
come into play through the annual determination of the acreage reduction per- 
centage (ARP). The reason the ARP was as high as 20 percent in  1985 (and 
27.5 percent in 1986 and 1987) is the large prior CCC stock accumulation. The 
450 million bushels added to stocks from the 1985 crop was piled on top of 
the  1.4 billion already  accumulated. If 300 million bushels could have been 
exported instead of being added to stocks, the ARP could have been reduced 
accordingly. At the U.S. average yield of about 35 bushels per acre, 8.5 million 
acres could have been planted that had been held idle. At a net rental value of 
wheat land of $40 per acre, the gain to wheat producers would be $340 million. 
The results of the two ways of accommodating a general wheat export sub- 
sidy under 1985 conditions are summarized in table 6.4. 
Given the existence of excessive CCC wheat stocks or ARPs, an export sub- 
sidy program has quite small costs. However, an option with still smaller costs 
would be to have a domestic consumption subsidy also. In figure 6.7, if s  were 
paid on all consumption the budget cost of the subsidy would be offset, except 
for a small triangle, by gains to U.S.  consumers.zo  An alternative, better policy 
would be to pay a larger subsidy on domestic consumption than on exports (or 
even taxing exports). This avoids using U.S. Treasury funds to provide lower- 
cost consumption abroad. 
Special Features of  EEP 
The EEP differs from a general export subsidy in three key respects: tar- 
geting of particular importing countries to receive subsidies, limiting the quan- 
tity of wheat eligible to each targeted country, and payment in kind of the sub- 
sidy in the form of CCC stocks. 
Targeting and quantity limitation are attractive because they reduce budget- 
ary outlays for subsidies and because they do not undercut the prices of  our 
nonsubsidizing competitors, notably Argentina and Australia. At least that is 
20. In fig. 6.7, this is achieved at a price of $2.00 per bushel. As compared to the $3.10 price, 
this policy would add $1.10  X  2.4 billion  = $2.64 billion of  budget outlays, partly offset by 
consumer gains of roughly $430 million and net CCC stock savings of $700 million (assuming 
CCC stocks valued at half the support price) or $5 10 million in producer gains if ARPs are reduced 
and stock buildup maintained. In either case the net cost of the policy is over $1.5 billion (mainly 
because of the bonanza given to foreign consumers). In fact, the 1985 marketing loan proposal of 
the wheat growers would have generated this kind of result. Because of  its potential budget costs 
(which depend crucially on the elasticity of total demand for wheat) this proposal was a nonstarter 
in the 1985 congressional debate. 316  Bruce L. Gardner 
Table 6.4  Results of Alternative Implementations of a $0.40 Wheat Export 
Subsidy under Mid-1980s Market Conditions (million dollars) 
Effect  Policy  1"  Policy 2b 
Budget cost of subsidy  -480  -480 
Budget savings on CCC stocks  465  0 
Overall budget effect 
Farm income effect 
Welfare gain 
-  15  -480 
0  +  340 
-  I5  -  140 
"Policy 1: Give a $0.40 export subsidy, holding ARP constant and reducing CCC stocks by  300 
million bushels. 
hPolicy 2: Give a $0.40 export subsidy, holding CCC stocks constant and reducing ARP by 8.5 
million acres. 
the thought. We pay the subsidy of  s to reduce the price of, say, one-third of 
U.S.  wheat exports  while  continuing  to sell the rest  at unsubsidized  world 
price. 
The question with respect to country targeting is whether the policy is cap- 
able of creating the price wedge s between the targeted and nontargeted wheat- 
importing countries. Transportation and other transactions costs between these 
countries  suggests there  would  not  be fully  price-equalizing  arbitrage.  But 
there is also the problem of redirection of the competitors' wheat exports. If the 
United States sends wheat to Algeria, replacing EC wheat, then the European 
Community sends the wheat that otherwise would have gone to Algeria to Iran, 
say. But despite the multichannel  nature of world wheat trade there are possi- 
bilities of U.S. export subsidies changing the spatial price pattern, and some 
economists have developed arguments on how the United States could exploit 
differing elasticities of demand for U.S. wheat to profit from targeted subsidies 
as a form of price discrimination (Dutton 1990).  However, the knowledge base 
on these elasticities and arbitrage possibilities is essentially nil, and these stud- 
ies have no detectable connection with the actual administration of the EEP, or 
with what the wheat producers had in mind. 
The quantity limitation raises other problems. As the wheat growers noted 
in their criticism of the first EEP sales to Egypt, once the sales were complete 
the European Community reentered the market and sold at the pre-EEP prices. 
It appears that the price at the margin is the nonsubsidized price, so there is no 
reason for the EEP recipients to consume more wheat with the EEP in place 
than without it. But if no country consumes more wheat because of the EEP, 
the market-clearing price will remain unchanged, as will U.S. and other coun- 
tries'  exports. EC exports and prices remain unchanged, and the United States 
will have done nothing  to force the European  Community  to increase their 
export subsidies, hence driving them to the GATT bargaining table. We have 
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government) on an intramarginal quantity of  wheat imports. However, there 
are complications. 
First, it is not clear that the U.S. EEP quantities are so limited as make sales 
intramarginal in the targeted countries. Second, payment in kind makes a real 
difference, even though subsidies are given to wheat exporters in the form of 
generic certificates that are transferable and can be used against any CCC- 
owned commodity. Even if exporters cash out their certificates, the buyer of 
them must redeem them for CCC commodities before their expiration date, so 
that wheat will inevitably be redeemed.*’  This was important in 1985 because 
the CCC by  law could not dispose of its stocks until market prices rose well 
above their current or likely attainable levels.22  Therefore, the EEP provided 
a way  to place on the market commodities that otherwise would have  been 
sequestered. In this way  the EEP tended to place general downward pressure 
on world wheat prices, by increasing marketed supplies. Chambers and Paarlb- 
erg (1991) argue that this effect could have caused the EEP to generate a net 
loss to the United States. However, if  CCC stock reductions trade off with 
equivalent ARP changes, the supply-increasing feature of the EEP subsidy can 
always be neutralized. 
6.3.2  Assessment of EEP Operations 
It seems impossible to predict much about the consequences of EEP on the 
basis of a general economic analysis of it. How then are the criteria to be met 
for EEP sales-additionality,  net economic gain, and budget neutrality-to  be 
assessed against the program’s operations? Turning first to the data for 1985- 
92, statistics of EEP shipments are shown in table 6.5. After a slow start, EEP 
exports reached 26.6 million metric tons in FY 1988, about half of  all U.S. 
wheat exports.23  The average subsidy reached $38 per ton in  1987. A price 
wedge this large on substantial quantities would be expected to make a notice- 
able difference in world trade flows and prices. 
‘Additionality ” 
As an initial step in assessing the effectiveness of targeted export subsidies 
under EEP, several economists have attempted estimates of additionality-the 
net increase in U.S. wheat exports caused by  each ton of EEP-assisted ship- 
ments. If one simply regresses wheat exports on EEP tonnage using the data 
of table 6.5 for 1986-92, the result indicates that each ton of EEP sales gener- 
ates 0.8 ton of exports. This means only 20 percent of the EEP sale replaces 
21. Indeed, by the end of 1991 all available CCC commodities had been distributed to holders 
22. The 1985 and 1990 farm acts made it easier to dispose of these stocks after 1985. 
23. Reporting of fiscal-year EEP data and crop-year total export data creates possible confusion. 
Fiscal years are October to September, and wheat crop years are June to  May. Fiscal years are 
referred to by the calendar year in which they end, and crop years by the calendar year in which 
they begin. 
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Table 6.5  EEP Wheat Sales and Bonuses 
Average 
Total  EEP Bonus  Total 
EEP Sales  EEP Bonus  ($ per  US.  Exportsa  EEP Shareb 






















































Sources: Ackerman and Smith (1990); Ackerman (1993, private communication). 
aFiscal-year  exports, which differ from crop-year data used elsewhere in this paper. Constructed from 
USDA monthly export statistics. 
bEEP  tonnage as percentage of total export tonnage. 
commercial exports that would have been made anyway; that is, “additionality” 
is 80 percent. However, if  we include the three years immediately preceding 
the EEP, thus incorporating a before-EEP and after-EEP.  contrast in the data, 
the result indicates additionality of zero. These results together indicate that a 
simple annual regression cannot provide a believable estimate of additionality. 
The approach taken in the literature is to build a supply-demand model of 
the world wheat market and simulate the effects of the EEP. To do this one has 
to model not only supply and demand equations in the countries involved, both 
the targeted markets and nontargeted ones, but also the trade linkages between 
them and the policy instruments that influence wheat trade. Moreover, some 
policy instruments abroad should be treated as endogenous since they may 
respond to EEP. Brooks, Devadoss, and Meyers (1990) argue that analyses that 
take policies other than the U.S. EEP as given miss a key element, at least as 
far as Canada is concerned, Canada’s wheat export policy is not explicitly rule 
driven; wheat is priced for export on an ad hoc basis by decisions of the Cana- 
dian Wheat Board,  which has  a monopoly on exports. The board  has  an- 
nounced it has a special program to counter U.S. EEP sales but has not re- 
vealed details, nor the prices received for Canadian wheat in the EEP-targeted 
markets. Australia has a similar wheat export monopoly. 
Given the difficulties of  specifying a simulation model that one can have 
confidence in for the purposes at hand, it is perhaps heartening that the range 
of additionality estimates is not large. Brooks et al. estimate that a ton of EEP 
exports added 8 to 13 percent of a ton to total exports in 1986-88. Ackerman 
and Smith (1990, 12) summarize five USDA Economic Research Service stud- 
ies whose estimates of additionality range from 2 to 30 percent. 319  The Political Economy of US. Export Subsidies for Wheat 
Additionality has become important in EEP policy because the budget neu- 
trality of the program depends on additionality. In the earlier calculations in- 
volving a general export subsidy additionality depended only on the elasticity 
of foreign demand for U.S. wheat. Matters are more complicated with the tar- 
geted EEP. Until the end of  FY  1991, subsidies in the form of  CCC stocks 
made budget neutrality  easy to justify because of the high costs of carrying 
these  Since November  1991, when the CCC exhausted its available 
stocks and introduced cash subsidies, the budget neutrality  of  EEP depends 
upon the program’s ability to increase the U.S. price of wheat and thus reduce 
deficiency payments. 
The way EEP increases the U.S. price is by increasing the total demand for 
U.S. wheat. USDA has been using a wheat simulation model in which each 
million ton increase in wheat exports generates an increase of $0.10 per bushel 
in the U.S.  farm price of wheat. The assumption that the CCC support level 
sets the market price is no longer appropriate since after 1985 the support level 
has been reduced and has always been substantially below the market price of 
wheat. Each $0.10 rise in the price of wheat reduces deficiency payments by 
$174 million.  Empirical  studies  suggest  additionality of  10 to 30 percent. 
Therefore an EEP of  20 million tons adds 2 to 6 million tons to U.S. export 
demand. With a $40 per ton bonus level, the budget outlays for the EEP are 
$800 million annually (recent levels). The 2 to 6 million ton increase in exports 
causes the wheat price to rise $0.20 to $0.60 per bushel and hence deficiency 
payments to decline $350 to $1050 million annually. Thus, if the high end of 
additionality pertains, which is what USDA assumes, deficiency payments fall 
by more than the cost of EEP bonuses and the EEP is budget neutral or better. 
Farm Income and Consumer Welfare Effects 
The main losses from the EEP accrue to domestic buyers of U.S. wheat. The 
exact incidence on the buyers’ side-among  farmers who feed wheat, millers, 
bakers, retailers, and final consumers-has  not been estimated. Because do- 
mestic final demand for foods containing wheat is quite inelastic, domestic 
consumption of these products is unlikely  to change appreciably because of 
the EEP, and in fact domestic use has been quite stable over time despite large 
changes in wheat prices.  It is therefore  unlikely  that the EEP reduced  the 
demand for, and thus the returns earned by processors, distributors, or other 
middlemen. Certainly the evidence in the political  debate is consistent with 
this conclusion. Millers and bakers who took public positions favored the EEP 
(usually because they had export as well as domestic interests). 
Farm use of wheat in feeding ranges from 5 to 20 percent of U.S. produc- 
tion. Wheat feeding is highly concentrated in the late summer months after 
24. CCC costs of holding grain are much higher than commercial storage rental rates plus the 
opportunity cost of funds tied up, which sum to about $0.40  per bushel annually. Stocks are “ro- 
tated” (old wheat replaced with new) and relocated periodically. GAO estimates it costs the CCC 
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winter  wheat  is harvested  but before the fall corn harvest,  especially  when 
year-end  stocks of  feed grains are low and old-crop prices high. Generally, 
livestock producers  who use this wheat have very  good substitutes in other 
feeds, so that feed use practically disappears in high-price years. If  the EEP 
drives up the U.S.  price of wheat 10  percent ($0.35 per bushel), and if livestock 
prices do not rise so that livestock producers absorb the feed cost increase, the 
expected cost of the EEP to the livestock industry is about $100 million annu- 
ally. To  the extent meat prices rise, the cost is shifted to consumers. The re- 
mainder of the cost of higher wheat prices is absorbed by consumers of bread, 
breakfast cereals, bakery products, and other food items containing wheat. 
USDA's  economic analysis, which is the basis for OMB's budget work on 
EEP, uses a model which provides estimates of farm income gains and con- 
sumer costs of EEP. The model estimates that an increase of $0.10 per bushel 
in the price of wheat raises farm income by $60 million and reduces consum- 
ers' surplus by  $120 million  (Salathe  1991). The consumer cost estimate as- 
sumes farm price increases for all domestically used wheat are passed on to 
consumers without any change in the farm-to-consumer markup or profits in 
the wheat-processing industry. The farm income increase is only about one- 
fourth of the rise in the market value of the wheat crop because three-fourths 
of wheat production is protected by deficiency payments which decline cent 
for cent as the market price rises.z5 
The overall domestic welfare effect of  the EEP can be estimated by  sum- 
ming the budget, consumer, and producer changes if we assume the farm in- 
come change is a change in economic rents (i.e., farmland and farm operator 
labor taken as fixed in supply). For the range of additionality of 0.1 to 0.3, the 
EEP at its average recent size of about 20 million tons and cost of $800 million 
annually generates the results shown in table 6.6. While an optimistic assump- 
tion of additionality permits EEP to achieve the objective of budget neutrality, 
no assumption permits the program to achieve its cost effectiveness objective 
of  providing a benefit to the  U.S. economy.2" It is possible, however, under 
optimistic additionality assumptions, that the EEP is not an extremely ineffi- 
cient mechanism for transferring income to farmers. With 0.3 additionality, 
25. This assumes the price rise occurs in the five-month peak marketing season. In the  1990 
Farm Act, in any case, the calculation of deficiency payments was changed to a full-year basis 
after 1993. Since the full-year price averages $0.10 per bushel above the five-month price, and the 
payment will be determined by  the maximum of the full-year price or the five-month price plus 
$0.10, this change was scored as a budget saving (about $120 million a year) in the 1990 Budget 
Reconciliation Act negotiations. 
26. If such calculations are to be used in budget planning, one should also consider the ARP as 
an alternative policy instrument. This is not a counterfactual exercise in the way invoking a lump- 
sum transfer as an alternative policy would be. The ARP is in fact adjusted annually. The CBO has 
argued that it would be preferable to reduce wheat acreage rather than grow wheat and subsidize its 
export. Assuming 0.3 additionality, the same deficiency payment, farm income, and consumer 
costs as in the right-hand column of table 6.6 could be achieved with a paid land division program 
that would cost about $400 million (for 8 million acres) instead of the $800 million EEP subsidy 
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Table 6.6  Economic Gains from the EEP (million dollars annually) 
Additionality 
Gain  0.1  0.3 
Cost of EEP subsidies  -  800  -  800 
Deficiency payment reduction  350  1,050 
Crop producers’ income gain  120  360 
Gain of wheat buyers (consumers and 
livestock feeders)  -  240  -720 
Subtotal: budgetary gain  -450  250 
Total U.S.  gaina  -570  -110 
”Assumes set-aside acreage (ARP) held constant. 
table 6.6  says it costs the U.S. economy a net (deadweight) loss of $1 10 million 
to transfer $360 million to wheat growers. 
International Effects 
Political discussion of the EEP from its inception emphasized the effects 
abroad as well as domestic effects in the United States. The Bush administra- 
tion in 1989 and Congress in its reauthorization of EEP in 1990 focused even 
more sharply on the foreign effects. The Food, Agriculture, Conservation and 
Trade (FACT) Act of  1990, which authorizes the EEP at a level of  not less 
than $500 million annually and explicitly authorizes cash as well as in-kind 
subsidies, gives the only purpose of  the EEP as being “to discourage unfair 
trade practices” (U.S.  Congress, House 1990, 335). The context for this focus 
was the continued expansion of  EC subsidized exports and EC intransigence 
on agriculture in the Uruguay Round, then scheduled for completion in De- 
cember  1990. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, enacted in October 
1990 along with the FACT Act, contained a “GATT trigger” which required 
spending $1 billion annually on EEP if no Uruguay Round agreement had been 
reached by June 30, 1992. Since no agreement had been reached at that time, 
EEP spending has proceeded at about the $1 billion rate.27 
The international effects of the EEP are impossible to estimate with preci- 
sion. Uncertainties  about effects on other countries’  exports and  on world 
prices are even greater than in estimates of U.S. export additionality. The inten- 
tion of  targeted EEP subsidies is to displace EC subsidized exports and in- 
crease the cost of EC export subsidies, yet not displace the exports of nonsubsi- 
27. The wheat EEP activity shown in table 6.2 accounts for most of  U.S. agricultural export 
subsidies, but EEP bonuses have also been paid for exports of feedgrains, vegetable oil, rice, eggs, 
frozen poultry, and dairy cattle. In FY 1992, total EEP bonuses were $966 million, of which $838 
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dizing  exporters.  If  perfectly  realized,  the  result  would  be  no  change  in 
worldwide wheat imports, no change in (nonsubsidized) world wheat prices, 
but  a rise in the  U.S.  wheat price and  wheat exports, and a fall EC wheat 
exports achieved  by  increased  stocks and reduced  acreage in the European 
Community. 
In fact, the European Community would be expected to respond by reducing 
acreage, as they have done, but  also by  countering  EEP subsidies with in- 
creased subsidies of their own, thus retaining part of the market. This competi- 
tion would be likely to remove the intramarginal nature of the subsidized price 
in importing countries and reduce the price of  all wheat in these contested 
markets. Therefore, total wheat imports in these countries should increase. The 
best markets in which to observe the consequences of the subsidy war are the 
North African wheat importers (Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunesia, and Libya), 
traditional buyers of  French wheat and flour which were the first and largest 
EEP targets (except Libya) and whose imports account for about 15 percent of 
world wheat trade. Aggregate wheat imports in these countries have increased 
since  1985.  Indications  are  that  North  African  buyers-principally 
government-related enterprises with substantial market power locally-have 
filled their needs via tenders and bargaining which results in all suppliers- 
the European Community, the United States, Canada, Australia, and (in Libya) 
Argentina-selling  for comparable prices (Ackerman 1993; Parker 1990). So 
the nonsubsidizing suppliers are being harmed as well: the Canadian and Aus- 
tralian wheat boards have to subsidize their sales in these markets also. 
A question can also be raised about the program’s capability of  separating 
targeted  and nontargeted  countries. Why would  nontargeted countries keep 
buying at nonsubsidized prices? Even if reexports from, say, Morocco to Korea 
are ruled out by  transportation  costs, Australian exports could easily be re- 
directed from North Africa to Korea if the price were higher in Korea. So we 
should expect to see wheat prices falling worldwide, except inside the United 
States and European  Community. Other countries’ wheat exports should be 
replaced by U.S. and EC wheat in importing countries where the United States 
and European  Community  compete,  while  competing  exporters  should  in- 
crease their market share in countries where the United States and European 
Community do not offer subsidies. Such shifts have in fact occurred, but none- 
theless the United States has retained the ability to export about half its wheat 
without EEP subsidies (although most of this has credit subsidies or is shipped 
in the  P.L.  480  food assistance programs).  Notably, Japan  continues to buy 
about 3 to 5 million metric tons of US.  wheat annually (10-15  percent of U.S. 
exports) at nonsubsidized prices.2x 
28. Taking Japan as an  importer with inelastic demand while other importers have relatively 
elastic demand and exporters inelastic supply, WK have an approximation (if other exporters coop- 
erate) of the situation shown by Dutton (1990)  tu create the possibility of targeted export subsidies 
being a second-best mechanism fur exporters to exercise monopoly power. This result would show 
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Fig. 6.8  World wheat prices 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service, Whear Yearbook (Washington, D.C., February  1994). 
Data on wheat border prices in  several countries are shown in figure 6.8. 
The EEP, if effective, should have increased the U.S. price, from which the 
subsidy is subtracted and transportation added to obtain the importing buyer’s 
price. And, if the EEP affected other countries’ prices it should have reduced 
them. Comparing two U.S. prices (Kansas City and US. Gulf) with Canada, 
Australia, and Rotterdam prices, no such pattern is apparent. Of course, the 
price levels everywhere are determined more by world crop conditions, U.S. 
ARPs, and macroeconomic factors than by the EEP. But none of these factors 
would place a wedge between  U.S. and other exporters’ wheat prices in the 
way  the EEP might do. Yet,  to take a long-term comparison, the difference 
between the U.S. Kansas City price and the Argentine, Canadian, Rotterdam, 
and Australian prices are largely the same in 1984 with no EEP and in  1992 
with an average EEP bonus of $40 per ton. Indeed, if there is a difference it is 
that the U.S. pricesfell relative to the foreign prices. 
The data are more consistent with the hypothesis that the EEP drove down 
the price of wheat in the targeted importing countries, with all the competing 
exporters who remained in those markets offering matching subsidies, while 
prices in the remaining markets were mutually determined by  spatial market 
forces which are basically the same as with no EEP. If this is true, the economic 
effects of the EEP are at the low end of the ranges given in table 6.3, perhaps 
even lower. 
The price relationship most crucial to the essentially null-effect interpreta- 
is reallocated from elastic-demand to inelastic-demand markets). Empirical evidence that this has 
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tion of EEP effects is that between the United States and Canada. If the EEP 
were to place a $30 to $50 wedge between U.S. and Canadian prices for a 
period of eight years there would be tremendous pressure to export Canadian 
wheat to  the United States. In  fact, such pressure in the past has led to the 
imposition of import quotas under the section 22 authorities described earlier. 
But section 22 import quotas were removed by  executive order in  1974 and 
have never been reinstated. 
In  1992 and 1993 there has at last occurred a surge of wheat imports from 
Canada, about 2 million tons each year. This is a quadrupling of such imports 
compared to the 1980-90  average. Yet as a percentage of either Canadian or 
US. wheat exports, the amounts are quite small (refer back to fig. 6.2). It is 
noteworthy also that much of these imports are of durum wheat, a type used 
primarily in making pasta, and grown in the United States predominantly in 
North Dakota and in Canada just across the border. The price of durum wheat 
moves rather independently of other wheats. 
The U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) investigated the Cana- 
dian exports of durum wheat to the United States in response to congressional 
requests. Their report (USITC 1990) attributes these exports in part to the EEP 
driving down the price of durum wheat in the markets to which Canada has 
traditionally been exporting this product. Since the ITC report, durum imports 
from Canada have increased substantially, from about 0.2 million metric tons 
annually to 0.7 million tons in 1992-93.  U.S. durum exports have continued at 
about 1.5 million tons annually during this period, with the majority receiving 
EEP subsidies in the range of $25-$50  per ton. In 1992, U.S. durum exports 
under EEP were 0.9 million tons, with an average bonus of $42.50 per ton 
(Alston and Carter 1993). This would appear a clear case of the EEP creating 
a wedge between U.S. and Canadian prices, so that durum wheat going out 
through the front door (to North Africa and South America) comes back in 
through Canada. The picture is complicated, however, by  the facts that U.S. 
durum wheat in  1992 had declined in price since 1989, sold at a lower price 
than average wheat in the U.S., and that U.S. durum wheat acreage and produc- 
tion declined in 1992 by roughly the amount of the increased Canadian ship- 
ments to the United States. The NAWG has cited the data of table 6.7 as show- 
ing a lack of correlation between U.S. durum exports under EEP and Canadian 
wheat exports to the United States. 
The economic analysis carries political freight because if  the imports are 
attributable to autonomous Canadian policies rather than being caused by the 
EEP, the case is better for imposing section 22 import quotas. The case to be 
made is that Canadian exports interfere with the operation of  the U.S. wheat 
program. These imports can be argued to have increased the cost of the prd- 
gram by driving up deficiency payments slightly, but whether this argument is 
legally sufficient remains to be determined. In the course of the NAFTA de- 
bate, the  Clinton  administration  promised  another  inquiry  into  the  matter, 
which the ITC subsequently undertook. In July 1994, the ITC found that wheat 325  The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat 
Table 6.7  Data on Wheat Trade between Canada and the United States 
(thousand metric tons) 
US.  EEP Sales of  Canadian Durum 
Crop Year  Durum Wheat  Exports to the  All Canadian Wheat 

































Source: National Association of Wheat Growers (1993, private communication). 
imports from Canada were increasing the cost of the U.S. wheat program but 
disagreed on the amount and made no recommendation for a remedy. In Au- 
gust the United States and Canada reached a one-year agreement under which 
Canadian wheat would be subject to a $50 per ton tariff for quantities above 
about two-thirds of  1993-94  import levels. The political context for this pro- 
tection was the Clinton administration’s effort to obtain the Democratic wheat- 
state senators’ support for the Uruguay Round GATT agreement. 
6.4  Political Response to the EEP 
In 1990 the legislation authorizing the EEP (and other farm programs) ex- 
pired and was reconsidered in a comprehensive set of hearings (U.S. Congress, 
House 1991; U.S. Congress, Senate 1991).  This provided a convenient oppor- 
tunity for interest groups to express second thoughts and suggested modifica- 
tions of the EEP. The NAWG, as well as representatives of other commodities 
using the program, were totally supportive of continuation of the EEP without 
substantial change. Concerns that had been expressed in the 1985 House hear- 
ings about targeting as opposed to a generally available subsidy disappeared. 
Grain users might have been expected to be more critical, but more of them 
supported EEP in 1990 than had in 1985. The American Bakers Association, 
the Biscuit and Cracker Manufacturers’ Association, and the North American 
Export Grain association all testified in favor of continuing the program. 
Grain exporters asked for changes in the procedures by  which export bo- 
nuses are awarded, which would give the companies greater flexibility in mak- 
ing deals with importers (U.S. Congress, Senate 1991, part 13). This however 
was the one area where concerns had been expressed by  nonfarm and some 
farm groups-that  the program was too friendly to exporting companies and 
that these companies rather than farmers were profiting from the program. This 
concern persists to the present, as exemplified in the recent New York Times 326  Bruce L. Gardner 
series on “Tainted Trade,” the first installment of which was headlined on page 
1 : “Abuses Plague Programs to Help Exports of Agricultural Products” (New 
York Times, October 10, 1993). None of the particular abuses cited-and  sub- 
stantively there were not many-involved  the wheat EEP  program.29  In addi- 
tion, economists have continued to assert,  based on arguments and analysis 
discussed earlier, that the EEP generated few benefits to farmers for its costs. 
Because of  firm  support from commodity  and  agribusiness  groups,  and 
weak opposition, the EEP emerged unchanged in structure and strengthened 
in budget in the  1990 Farm Act. EEP spending was far higher in FY  1991-93 
than in any previous three-year period (table 6.5). The solid political support 
was attributable not so much to particular export achievements of the EEP, but 
to farmers’ general satisfaction with the recovery of  farm income from mid- 
1980s lows and the role of the commodity programs in that recovery. CCC 
wheat inventories had been sold off, deficiency payments protected producers 
from low prices  in  1986, the export market had  recovered  with the dollar’s 
decline from its 1985 high, and reduced output boosted wheat prices back to 
1980-81  level in 1989 and 1990. Farm interests in the  1990 farm bill debate 
were  devoted mainly  to attempting to forestall the budget cuts of  about $2 
billion  annually that the Bush administration was calling for. The EEP was 
thus seen as a piece of a set of  programs that was working. Beyond general 
satisfaction with the situation,30  a principal threat to U.S. grain producers was 
seen to be EC subsidized exports. The EEP  was seen as particularly  valuable 
in this situation, with the Uruguay Round languishing. 
Opposition to EEP was mitigated  because farm bill reformers focused on 
other policies. The only organized reform effort, by a coalition of conservative 
Republicans and urban Democrats in the House of Representatives, brought to 
the floor of the House amendments to reduce or eliminate the sugar, wool, and 
honey programs and eliminate deficiency payments to farms with over a mil- 
lion dollars in sales or to farmers who earned more than $100,000 from off- 
farm sources. These amendments all failed. These had more apparent popular 
appeal than an anti-EEP amendment would have; this helps explain why none 
was offered. 
A second important factor mitigating opposition to EEP was its being scored 
as budget neutral. The reforms that were successful in the 1990 Farm Act, most 
notably the introduction of a 15 percent reduction in deficiency payments by 
making  15 percent of  each producer’s base acreage ineligible for payments, 
29. The two main abuses were tobacco export assistance (not under EEP) that subsidized exports 
by U.S.  tobacco companies of foreign-grown leaf and corruption (Iraq allegedly using credit meant 
for grain import to buy arms) in the sale of rice to Iraq in the period leading up to the invasion of 
Kuwait in  1990. 
30. It may be thought that farmers’ positive attitude is being overstated in view of the complaints 
of many farm witnesses and the gloomleading of many Agriculture Committee members. Evidence 
that  this  was aimed  at forestalling cuts rather than changing programs is the absence of  major 
proposed changes in the  1990 debate. Recall too that President Bush won the farm vote in 1992 
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was driven by the budget reconciliation agreement to cut $1 3 billion from farm 
program spending over the five fiscal years  1992-96.  The $1  billion  annual 
spending on EEP would have been a prime target for cuts if the program had 
not been scored as budget neutral by OMB. 
After  passage  of  the  1990 Farm  Act  the  EEP became  politically  still 
stronger. In 1993-94  EEP sales were extended to Mexico. The GATT triggers 
locked a minimum of $1 billion annually for EEP bonuses. The Canadian gov- 
ernment has objected to this program on several occasions. When President 
Bush was planning his visit to Australia in  1991, the White House found to 
their surprise that the lead item for discussion between the heads of  state, in 
the Australian view, was U.S. wheat exports under the EEP. 
The desired route to demise of the EEP would be implementation of  the 
Uruguay Round GATT agreement. In agriculture the agreement requires multi- 
lateral  phase-down  of  export subsidies, including  the EEP. In the  end, this 
agreement  could  be  considered  a  success  in  the  same vein  as President 
Reagan's  arms buildup  in  promoting  nuclear weapons  agreements  with  the 
USSR. Even without the Uruguay Round, it is noteworthy that the European 
Community has in 1991-94  introduced significant reforms of the CAP, includ- 
ing acreage set-aside and other measures to reduce outlays on their export sub- 
sidies. The strength of U.S. willingness to spend on EEP quite likely had a role 
in encouraging these reforms, though how important a factor is ~nclear.~' 
6.5  Conclusions 
A summary of  interest group positions on the EEP, and how they fared, is 
shown in table 6.8. The most active group, wheat producers, were substantial 
economic gainers from the program. Wheat-exporting businesses were less ac- 
tive but  were  also supportive  of  EEP, and were winners.  Other agricultural 
producers, notably feed grains, gained by obtaining a piece of the EEP action 
and also supported the program. The losing groups-domestic  grain proces- 
sors and consumers-did  not visibly oppose the program. 
The most striking feature of the political economy of the EEP is how little 
impact  standard economic  arguments  have  had.  Economists  have produced 
many analyses showing that the program, even as a second-best measure, gen- 
31. What is the U.S. gain from CAP reform? Although it is even more conjectural than the 
earlier calculations, CAP reform along the lines being implemented could well reduce EC wheat 
exports by  3 to 4  million tons annually and raise the US.  market price by  $0.20 to $0.30 per 
bushel. The resulting gain for U.S. producers would be $120 to $180 million annually, and the 
gains to taxpayers would be  $350 to $520 million (because of  less deficiency payments). U.S. 
consumers would lose $240 to $360 million. The overall net gain to the United States, equal 
roughly to the price increase times wheat exports, would be $230 to $350 million. 
Suppose the EEP accelerated CAP reform by  five years. Then the EEP generated $I. 1 to $1.8 
billion for the United States. The overall U.S. cost of the EEP in 1990-92 was about $350 million 
annually, or about $2 billion for 1986-93. These calculations are of course crude, but they indicate 
that it is quite difficult to obtain any net U.S. gain from EEP as a strategic investment, even under 
the assumption that it successfully induced policy changes in the European Community. 328  Bruce L. Gardner 




Most Active  Least Active  or Neutral  Opposed 
Winners 
Wheat producers  X 
Wheat exporters  X 
Rice, feed grains, and other EEP-eligible 
farmers  X 
Custom wheat harvesters and input supplies 
Mixed or no effect 
General farm organizations  X 
Millers'  X 
Losers 
X 
Consumer groups  X 
Livestock producers  X  X 
Public-interest watchdogsb  X  X 
Bakers  X 
aMillers were not all losers because subsidies are paid for some flour as well as wheat exports. 
bPrincipally op-ed columnists and other authors. 
erates a net loss to the U.S. economy, although some have muddied the waters 
by  showing that a precisely calibrated system of  country-specific export sub- 
sidy rates could be welfare increasing if the United States has varying degrees 
of monopoly power in different wheat import markets (e.g., Abbott, Paarlberg, 
and Sharples 1987). The lack of  clout of  the overall U.S. welfare argument 
is not surprising given the prevalence of government activity that generates 
deadweight losses in order to redistribute income. 
It is perhaps more surprising that fact-based analyses that argued farmers as 
well as the rest of  the economy would be better off under alternative policies 
did not cut more ice politically (e.g., Paarlberg 1988). It seems clear in retro- 
spect that for such an argument to be effective it has to be accepted by farmers 
themselves as well as by  disinterested observers. The agriculture committees 
take their cue first and foremost from farmers, and if farmers are united, only 
very strong opposition can be effective. 
In order for wheat growers to abandon EEP, they would have to be shown 
how they could be made just as well off with alternative policies that are politi- 
cally feasible. The option of  cutting acreage with an increased ARP causes 
farm income to be lower for a given price of wheat because of the opportunity 
cost of idled acres. Political feasibility also means avoiding the one nonfarm 
source of strong opposition, objection to increased budget outlays. This rules 
out the standard approach that economists offer, nondistorting or less distorting 
transfer payments. With acreage and yield bases fixed, and farmers free to plant 
alternative program  crops without  affecting their payments,  increasing the 329  The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat 
wheat target price would provide payments not far from being a nondistorting 
transfer (apart from the marginal cost of raising government funds). But budg- 
etary pressure makes this a nonstarter. 
The biggest losers from the EEP are buyers of wheat, with losses of $250 to 
$600  million  per year  according to estimates presented  earlier,  with recent 
world price data suggesting the lower end of the range is more likely. But no 
buyers of wheat-millers,  bakers, livestock producers, or consumers of retail 
products  containing  wheat-have  raised politically  significant objections to 
the program. Agribusiness interests probably did not bear any losses. Livestock 
feeders’ costs have not been substantial, and a feeling of  solidarity together 
with logrolling keeps them from opposing the program.32 Consumer costs are 
only about $1 to $3 per year per person; and the general public remains gener- 
ally supportive of  farmers according to polls. 
In short, the EEP has proved  a political winner because:  wheat producers 
see a benefit from it; wheat producers have a unified  view on the issue, and 
they have effective channels of influence through the congressional agriculture 
committees; wheat buyers  have not  opposed the program;  the program  has 
been accepted as budget neutral. 
There are two points of vulnerability  for the EEP in the near future. The 
first is in the budgetary arena. Budget-neutrality arguments are becoming less 
plausible now that CCC stocks are no longer used as bonuses, and apparent 
effects on U.S. prices are small. FY 1995 agricultural appropriations, enacted 
in September 1994, contain  a $200 million reduction  in EEP that has been 
scored as a budget savings. The second point is that the GATT agreement in 
agriculture requires a reduction of the EEP. This places EEP reform as part of 
a policy package that would make U.S. farmers as well as nonfarmers better 
off than at present. 
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Comment  Robert Paarlberg 
Gardner’s paper on the Export Enhancement Program  (EEP) is exceptionally 
strong, by  far the best work that has yet been done on this topic. What inter- 
ested me most was his questioning how such a costly and ineffective policy 
could remain politically popular for so long. Several years ago I wrote a brief 
article of  my own entitled, “The Mysterious Popularity of  EEP’ (Paarlberg 
1990). Gardner’s analysis is thorough and careful on the evolution and the con- 
sequences of  EEP, but to some extent it only deepens the mystery  as to the 
program’s popularity. 
One key to the program’s survival, Gardner shows, was its scoring by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as “budget neutral.” Several larger 
questions arise from this scoring which might deserve more analysis. 
First, what explains the fact that the deficit hawks at OMB were sooner will- 
ing than the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to designate EEP as budget 
neutral,  despite  evidence  from  inside  the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture 
(USDA) itself that the additionality gained by EEP was only about one-third 
the amount needed to claim budget neutrality?’ More important, why did OMB 
hold on to this unrealistic  claim even after surplus stocks were gone and the 
program was cashed out in  1991? My own suspicion is that OMB was taking 
an indulgent view of EEP in part because of its own original role in creating 
the EEP, in  1985. OMB was reluctant to punish  EEP because OMB, under 
David Stockman’s leadership, had been the original midwife of the program. 
In this regard, EEP may not be the only program instrument that plays a promi- 
nent role in US.  agricultural policy because of the influence and indulgence 
of OMB. Acreage reduction programs (ARPs) also tend to be championed by 
OMB, despite the long-term damage they do to the competitiveness of US. 
agricultural exports, and to the economic health of rural America. 
A second question also arises from EEP’s budget-neutral scoring. How is it 
that measures like budget neutrality have come to be more important, in the 
agricultural policy debate, than measures such as cost effectiveness in contrib- 
uting  to national welfare, or even to farmer  income? The EEP, as Gardner 
shows, is a terribly inefficient way to support farm income in the United States. 
Like most export subsidies, its primary effect is to transfer welfare to foreign 
customers (who get the wheat they normally would have been buying at a lower 
than normal cost). If the purpose of the program is to boost farm prices in the 
United States by removing wheat from the market, it would actually be cheaper 
for taxpayers to remove that wheat by purchasing it and burning it, rather than 
trying to create additional sales abroad with subsidies that tend to be immedi- 
Robert Paarlberg is professor of political science at Wellesley College and associate at the Har- 
1. Kenneth W.  Bailey estimated only 0.1 additionality during the early years of  the program 
vard University Center for International Affairs. 
(Bailey 1989). 333  The Political Economy of U.S. Export Subsidies for Wheat 
ately offset by similar subsidies from competitors such as the European Com- 
munity. 
In the policy debate in Washington, however, the only important standard 
for measuring EEP has seemed to be its short-term budget cost compared to 
currentpolicy. In areas like agriculture where current policy is costly and inef- 
fective, this is not strict enough a standard. Under these circumstances, prais- 
ing the EEP for budget neutrality  is a bit like praising someone for having 
switched from gambling away his paycheck  to drinking away his paycheck, 
because his behavior change was “paycheck neutral.” 
Another area I might look into more deeply is the alleged contribution made 
by EEP to Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms, and to the recent com- 
pletion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) negotiations. Gardner makes an interesting calculation, that even if 
EEP advanced CAP reform by five years, its overall cost to the U.S. economy 
still exceeded the benefit. I would go farther, since there is no convincing evi- 
dence that EEP was key to CAP reform. The Australian Bureau of Agriculture 
and Resource Economics estimated several years ago that EEP was only in- 
creasing the budget cost of the CAP in Europe by  about 1.5 percent. It takes 
courage to argue that this small straw played any role in breaking the camel’s 
back. In some ways, EEP was on balance unhelpful in the Uruguay  Round 
since it antagonized our allies there (Australia and Canada) much more than it 
punished the European Community. True, the United States in the end traded 
away a 21 percent reduction in EEP for a 21 percent subsidized export volume 
reduction in the European Community, but this came after the European Com- 
munity had already embraced its MacShany Plan reform, which would have 
made  likely  a significant  volume  reduction  in  any  case, with  or without  a 
GATT agreement. Moreover, it is not yet clear how the modified Blair House 
agreement on export subsidies will function. There is some danger that as the 
use of direct export subsidies declines, the use of export credits, credit guaran- 
tees, blended credits, market promotion, barter, and “food aid’ will expand. 
There is also a danger that the Uruguay Round outcome will help, in the 
end, to keep the EEP in place indefinitely. Farm groups will argue that “we 
bargained hard” for an allowable level of export subsidies, and to provide any- 
thing less will be “unilateral disarmament.” The GATT ceiling on export sub- 
sidies, in other words, could start to become a floor. 
What might it take, in the end, to prompt a termination of EEP? Most of my 
own predictions, until now, have been wrong. I originally thought the program 
would  end  after the  1988 summer  drought,  which eliminated  U.S.  surplus 
stocks of wheat, and hence ended the “surplus disposal” justification for the 
program.  EEP remained  in  place,  however, because  farm groups  said they 
needed it as a “bargaining chip” in the Uruguay  Round. They claimed they 
wanted EEP to get a better GATT, but in fact they were using the negotiations 
in GATT to hold on to a bigger EEP. 
I next thought the program would end in 1992, when stock shortages actu- 334  Bruce L. Gardner 
ally forced the CCC to  stop providing  “bonus” wheat flour to the domestic 
school lunch program. I could not imagine there would be support for continu- 
ing to subsidize consumers in Russia and Egypt at a time when poor consumers 
in the United States were being denied. Several months later, however, Presi- 
dent Bush expanded the program, part of an election-year play to wheat-state 
political leaders. 
I then concluded that the program probably would not end until it became 
clear that scandalously large subsidies were going to foreign governments with 
which the United States had major diplomatic differences. This, after all, was 
how  an earlier U.S. wheat export subsidy policy  was ended, following the 
“great grain robbery” sale to the Soviet Union in 1972. In early 1994, however, 
even this hypothesis proved  unfounded, when  USDA offered a record-high 
$65 per ton subsidy to the government of China, at precisely the same moment 
that China was being targeted by other U.S. government  agencies with eco- 
nomic sanctions, for various human rights transgressions. Not even this sale 
was sufficient to discredit the program. 
So it is that the mystery of EEP’s popularity deepens. 
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